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IS ANTITRUST ANTI-AUTONOMY?
Thomas L. Greaney*
AS ORGANIZED MEDICINE would have it, physicians to-day are yearning to compete even more vigorously, but feel
they can do so only if they can control the networks through
which they market their services while remaining in unintegrated,
fee-for-service delivery systems that entail no sharing of risk. As
a general matter, with respect to entry by new ventures, antitrust
law takes the philosophy of letting a thousand flowers bloom,
leaving it to the competitive marketplace (rather than the judici-
ary) to do the pruning. Where, however, it appears that kudzu
may suffocate the garden, traditional antitrust principles require
some judicious gardening. Organized medicine, it seems, is lob-
bying to fire the gardener, or at least send him on vacation until
the end of the growing season.
Jack R. Bierig's article, Physician-Sponsored Managed Care
Networks: Two Suggestions for Antitrust Reform, asserts that an-
titrust law has unfairly discriminated against certain physician
networks, thereby denying the public of certain benefits (which
are not specified) associated with this form of health care deliv-
ery system.' This Response contends that Bierig has misread the
economic foundations of current law enforcement policies while
advancing no sound basis for believing that consumers would be
better off or markets more efficient under his reform proposals.
While some improvement in interpreting the boundary between
impermissible cartelizing schemes and legitimate network joint
ventures is needed, there is no principled reason for allowing
physicians to assemble in large networks that would risk under-
mining the competitiveness of medical services markets.
* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University. B.A., 1970 Wesleyan University, J.D.,
1973 Harvard Law School. The research assistance of Megan Flaskamper is gratefully
acknowledged.
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I. ORGANIZED MEDICINE'S CRITICISMS OF
COMPETITION POLICY
A. Background: The Movement to Limit Antitrust Oversight
of Health Care Providers
Organized medicine's legislative and regulatory agenda be-
trays nostalgia for an era of professional sovereignty that cannot
readily be reconciled with the premises of the modem competi-
tive environment. Devoting unprecedented resources to lobbying
efforts and political campaigns2 during the frenzied health reform
debate, health care providers sought to sculpt state and federal
health reform so as to preserve their own incomes and autonomy.
These efforts included a variety of legislative proposals to regu-
late managed care, curb application of antitrust laws, compel
payors to contract with all providers, and derail health reform
proposals that would have hastened the nation's switchover to
managed care.3
In his Article, Bierig takes aim at a relatively narrow target:
antitrust law's treatment of physician-controlled networks that do
not share financial risk. (Bierig's Article reiterates his arguments
made before the Physician Payment Review Commission last
year. The Commission concluded that there was not sufficient
evidence to warrant exempting physician-sponsored networks
from the antitrust laws.4) It should be noted, however, that state
and federal lawmakers have been treated recently to a much
more wide-ranging assault on the application of antitrust to the
health care industry. Over the years, representatives of the Amer-
ican Medical Association (AMA) and other physician groups
2. Rick Wartzman, Foes of Health Care Reform Are Big Donors in Congressional
Races, Study Shows, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 1994, at A4 (reporting that one in every five dol-
lars given to congressional candidates by political action committees and large donors came
from those trying to defeat comprehensive health care reform).
3. See George Anders & Laura Johannes, Doctors Are Losing A Lobbying Battle to
HMOs, WALL ST. J., May 15, 1995, at BI (describing lobbying efforts in over 20 state legis-
latures to gain passage of the AMA's "Patient Protection Act" and other bills to subject
HMOs and other managed care companies to regulation concerning their ability to drop par-
ticipating physicians, to require that employers allow workers to go outside HMOs for a fee,
and to assure easier entry for physicians into HMO networks). See also Managed Care Per-
spectives: Medicaid, Medicare Managed Care Reforms Expected, Anti-Managed-Care Provi-
sions to Be Hotly Debated, MANAGED CARE WEEK, Jan. 23, 1995, at 1 (describing AMA's
support for "any willing provider" legislation, which would require that managed care plans
offer due process protection to deselected providers, and that HMOs offer point-of-service
plans).
4. 1995 PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REV. COMM'N, ANN. REP. 284.
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have advocated more sweeping changes in antitrust law, ranging
from outright immunity for procedural restrictions upon federal
enforcement agencies to broad safe harbors for physician net-
works.5 Hospitals, 6 insurers,7 and pharmaceutical manufacturers 8
5. Health Care Revision: Hearing of the Subcomm. on Economic and Commercial Law
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (statement of Merle W.
Delmer, M.D., Chair, Council on Legislation, AMA) (supporting legislation establishing safe
harbors for any physician joint venture containing no more than 25% of providers in a given
specialty in the relevant geographic market). See also Health Care Reform: Do Antitrust Laws
Discourage Cost Cutters or Defeat Price Gougers?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Anti-
trust, Monopolies and Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. 92-95 (1993) (statement of Richard F. Corlin, Vice Speaker, House of Delegates, AMA)
(outlining the AMA's support of legislation which permits physicians collectively to negotiate
issues of managed care administration and reimbursement with third party payors, requires
managed care plans to establish physician advisement committees, grants medical professional
organizations antitrust immunity when enforcing self-imposed quality standards, and grants
antitrust immunity for health care fraud and abuse informants); James S. Todd, Physicians as
Professionals, Not Pawns, HEALTH AiF., Fall 1993, at 145 (outlining AMA proposals to
change antitrust enforcement to allow physicians, through their professional organizations, to
negotiate fees, create joint marketing arrangements to negotiate with payors regardless of
shared financial risk, form non-integrated physician groups to negotiate with "powerful"
payors, and encourage physician committees to advise managed care plans); AMA Suggests
Refinement, Revisions of Health Industry Enforcement Policy, 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) 487 (Oct. 14, 1993) [hereinafter AMA Suggests Refinement] (listing the AMA's sug-
gestions to expand physician network safety zones from 20% to 50% of the physician market,
include equity investment in physician joint ventures as substantial risk sharing, and propose
safety zones for physician fee information sharing with purchasers); Michael deCourcy Hinds,
House Vote Would End FT.C. Rules for Doctors, N.Y. Tsam, Dec. 2, 1982, at A18 (describ-
ing AMA lobbying efforts for legislation to exempt medical professionals from FTC antitrust
jurisdiction); Office of the Gen. Couns., AMA, Antitrust Reform 4 (1995) (on file with au-
thor) (proposing legislation which would permit physician networks to offer fee-for-service
plans, to expand range of fee withhold arrangements constituting risk sharing under 1994 An-
titrust Enforcement Guidelines, to allow equity investment in physician joint ventures as risk
sharing, to expand the maximum number of physicians in a particular specialty who are al-
lowed to participate in a single physician joint venture, and to advocate state legislation
granting physicians antitrust immunity); AMA Policy Compendium 175 (1990) (on file with
author) (advocating placing the FTC under Congressional authority, supporting legislation re-
quiring courts to consider public interest aspects when reviewing health care delivery activity,
and opposing restrictions on physician participation in health care plan decision making); Let-
ter from Kirk B. Johnson, General Counsel, AMA, and John M. Peterson, Counsel, Chicago
Medical Society, to Donald S. Clark, Secretary, FTC 1 (Apr. 30, 1992) (on file with Health
Matrix) (requesting an advisory opinion regarding professional peer review of physician's
fees).
6. See Fredric J. Entin et al., Hospital Collaboration: The Need for an Appropriate An-
titrust Policy, 29 WAKE Foansr L REv. 107 (1994) (identifying the need for more freedom in
collaborative price structuring among hospitals to deliver health care effectively while remain-
ing commercially viable and without violating the antitrust laws).
7. New Coalition of Insurers Opposes Repeal of McCarran-Ferguson Exemption, 66
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 653 (June 16, 1994) (describing insurer group's opposi-
tion to modification of the industry's partial exemption from antitrust laws).
8. See Letter from Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
U.S. Dep't. of Justice, to John R. Ferguson, Swidler & Berlin (Oct. 1, 1993) (announcing the
Dep't of Justice's intention to oppose the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association's propo-
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also have pressed claims for immunity, or limitations on antitrust
scrutiny.
B. Antitrust and Autonomy
Lost perhaps in the provider lobby's fusillade upon antitrust
is the central role that body of law has played in promoting au-
tonomy. It has helped preserve an environment conducive to pro-
fessional independence while at the same time rejecting the
claims of those who would impose coercive governmental or pri-
vate regulatory schemes upon health care professionals.
First, it should be remembered that antitrust enforcers led
the battle against those who would have thwarted the develop-
ment of innovative systems that, in many ways, promote profes-
sional values. HMOs, for example, enable physicians to integrate
their activities and direct their practices in accordance with pro-
tocols, incentives, and guidelines that they, in their professional
judgment, deem best for the patient. In addition, the courts stead-
fastly have resisted attempts by some to misuse the antitrust laws
to prohibit professional collaboration in establishing practice
guidelines, or to inhibit professional boards and societies from
adopting standards and excluding those who do not meet the
standards. Two notable Seventh Circuit cases upholding reasona-
ble, non-coercive efforts of physicians collectively to promote
such standards and dispense information to the marketplace illus-
trate the point. In Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopedic
Surgeons,9 the court rejected a physician's claim that an unwar-
ranted denial of membership in a professional academy amounted
to an illegal boycott. The Court required proof of an effect on
competition and held that the mere loss of referrals would not
suffice, absent proof that the Academy had prevented others
from dealing with the doctor. Similarly, the Court in Schachar v.
American Academy of Ophthalmology,10 broadly upheld the rights
of medical groups to agree upon and promulgate standards that
sal to set maximum price increases among its members).
9. 977 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1992) (unpublished opinion) (stating that the professional
academy's denial of membership is not an antitrust violation even if it makes it harder for
plaintiff to receive referrals).
10. 870 F2d 397 (7th Cir. 1989) (ruling that the professional academy did not violate
antitrust laws in declaring a surgical procedure experimental because the academy did not im-
pose enforcement requirements on its members).
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may disadvantage some competitors, provided there is no effort
to constrain others to abide by those standards.
Nor is there any evidence that professional goals are in any
way sacrificed by enforcement of the antitrust laws. The Bierig
Article does not cite any studies that suggest that the core of
professional activities-promoting and sharing research, develop-
ing scientific methods, and advancing knowledge to improve pa-
tient care-are inhibited by the limitations placed on physician
networks that the Article describes. Indeed, quality measures,
such as they exist, tend to show above average performance for
risk-bearing HMOs." Moreover, it appears that it is those very
entities, such as HMOs in which physicians have assumed finan-
cial risk, that have taken the lead in assembling information and
developing practice parameters designed to improve quality and
assure the link between treatments and outcomes.12
Only under a very skewed definition of "professional auton-
omy" could it be said that antitrust law improperly interferes
with professional judgments. Antitrust law preserves the opportu-
nity of physicians to adopt methods and standards based on sci-
entific principles that command widespread acceptance in their
community. Moreover, it preserves autonomy in the sense of en-
couraging professional independence as long as collective actions
do not coerce others or impair efficiency through the exercise of
market power. Physicians are free to create, own, and operate in-
tegrated networks; to credential participants in such networks ac-
cording to almost whatever criteria they may choose (for exam-
ple, only doctors with Case Western Reserve diplomas); to
participate in selective credentialling by hospitals and other insti-
tutions; to participate in certification of medical specialists and
accreditation of hospitals; to assess medical technologies; to rec-
ommend all manner of guidelines, protocols, or parameters gov-
erning appropriate medical practice; and to engage in peer re-
view of the conduct of their fellow practitioners.1 3 What they
may not do is engage in coercive practices that prohibit others
11. Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft, Managed Care Plan Performance Since 1980:
A Literature Analysis, 271 JAMA 1512, 1518 (1994) (showing, through a literature survey,
better or equivalent quality of care results for HMOs compared with fee-for-service plans).
12. See GHAA Survey Shows Premium Decline, Record Enrollment Increases for 1995,
2 Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) 2051 (Dec. 12, 1994) (reporting that 82% of HMOs use
specific clinical practice guidelines and 85% require staff to develop and implement
guidelines).
13. See generally BARRY R. FuRRow ET AL., 1 HEaLT LAw §§ 10-5-10-15 (1995).
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from pursuing alternative conceptions of what is in the best in-
terests of their patients, or form loose, uncoordinated networks of
solo practitioners that are primarily devices to assure coordinated
pricing or cause other anticompetitive effects. Hence, the limits,
if any, that antitrust imposes on providers has little to do with
their core "professional" endeavors.
C. Antitrust and Network Rivalry
In today's climate of burgeoning competition among man-
aged care providers, the most important objective of antitrust is
to preserve the opportunity for the development of rivalrous
health plans in each local market. Inter-plan rivalry is central to
a policy of reliance on the marketplace to improve the health
care system, whether or not federal or state governments decide
to "manage" competition through legislative reforms. Conse-
quently, preservation of market structures conducive to competi-
tion ranks as the most crucial role for antitrust enforcement.
For health plans to offer services at competitive prices, they
must have the benefit of vigorous rivalry among providers in
each "product market" for provider services. Ideally, then, each
physician service market should remain free of cartelization
schemes or dominant or oligopolistic market structures. The ex-
perience of the last twenty years makes it clear that competition
can be subverted by a variety of antitrust abuses ranging from
garden variety cartels that impede network formation, to profes-
sional restraints that inhibit willingness to join networks that de-
mand new ways of practice or payment, and to structural impedi-
ments to competition arising from "overinclusive" provider
networks. The bottom line of appropriate antitrust policy is fos-
tering development of efficiently configured networks to compete
on the basis of quality, price, outcomes, and other variables that
employers and subscribers care about.
Is antitrust law successfully preserving rivalrous provider
markets? It appears that government antitrust policy, reflected in
the cases, speeches, policy statements, and advisory opinions has
a credible record in this regard. Federal and state agencies, for
the most part, have sent out the right message in their public
pronouncements, guidelines, and advisory opinions. Moreover,
they have challenged anticompetitive conduct and consolidations
that threaten competitive provider market structures. However,
the overall effectiveness of antitrust enforcement may prove to
[Vol. 6:129
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be rather a different story. State and federal agencies may be too
overwhelmed by the sheer magnitude of consolidation to appraise
carefully the situation in countless local markets. Criminal en-
forcement seems to have disappeared in the wake of the govern-
ment's Pyrrhic victory in the Alston case.1 4 Meanwhile, antitrust
doctrine in the areas of standing and antitrust injury may have
eviscerated the private cause of action as a meaningful source of
monitoring anticompetitive conduct or market structure.
It must be acknowledged that preservation of competitive
network structures poses especially thorny problems. Recent eco-
nomic analysis questions whether a sufficient number of effi-
ciently sized provider networks will develop to support effective
competition in many markets. Demographic evidence suggests
that a significant proportion of local health care services markets
lack the population base to support the minimum number of inte-
grated delivery systems (IDSs) necessary for inter-plan rivalry.15
In antitrust terms, the concern is that the demographic features of
many parts of the country dictate that only oligopolistic provider
networks will emerge. Consequently, tacit or explicit collusion
that will undermine the cost-containment benefits of competition
is likely in these markets. Furthermore, in sparsely populated ar-
eas, it may be possible only to organize hospitals and physicians
into one efficiently sized network.16 With so much of the faith in
managed competition riding on inter-plan rivalry, the importance
of antitrust policy directed at maximizing the number and com-
petitiveness of plans in each market is evident.
14. United States v. Alston, 974 F.2d 1206 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming per se analysis of
conduct, but remanding for new trial).
15. See Richard Kronick et al., The Marketplace in Health Care Reform: The Demo-
graphic Limitations of Managed Competition, 328 NEw ENG. J. MED. 148 (1993) (noting that
only 42% of the nation's population live in areas that could support three or more "classic
HMOs;" that 63% live in areas that could support three plans providing most primary and
acute care services but sharing facilities for certain hospital and tertiary care; and that 71%
live in areas that could support three plans offering primary care but sharing some basic spe-
cialty services like cardiology and urology). See generally Thomas L. Greaney, Managed
Competition, Integrated Delivery Systems and Antitrust, 79 Coian.t L. Rnv. 1507, 1521-23
(1994) (discussing various proposals for reorganization of the health care delivery system).
16. Greaney, supra note 15, at 1521.
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II. CRITIQUE OF THE AMA POSITION
A. Misunderstandings of the Ancillary Restraint Doctrine
The Bierig Article argues that with respect to physician-
sponsored networks, the rule of reason has been misinterpreted
by the Supreme Court and the federal enforcement agencies. Un-
fortunately, Bierig betrays a faulty understanding of the proper
analytic framework for evaluating restraints of trade and joint
ventures. Although the case law is somewhat murky on this
point, William Howard Taft's seminal Addyston Pipe decision 7
sheds a widely acknowledged beacon of light on the appropriate
methodology for distinguishing cartels from legitimate joint ven-
tures and evaluating the competitive significance of the latter.
That decision advanced a classification scheme that
designates as "naked" those restraints whose purpose or evident
effect is to suppress competition in the market as a whole.
Agreements that eliminate some degree of competition but are
necessary to effectuate a cooperative enterprise that enhances
overall competition in the market are deemed "ancillary." The
consequence of classification as an ancillary restraint is examina-
tion under the rule of reason to determine if, after balancing
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects, its net effect is to
harm competition.
Understanding Taft's ancillary restraint doctrine requires an
appreciation of its doctrinal underpinnings. The Addyston Pipe
opinion sought to establish a coherent and workable methodology
that avoided early Supreme Court explications of the Sherman
Act that had vacillated from literal interpretations (condemning
all restraints), to imprecise categories (such as whether a restraint
was "direct" or "indirect"), to open-ended inquiries into all rel-
evant facts bearing on "reasonableness." Taft adopted a decid-
edly pragmatic approach, but one that is widely acclaimed for in-
corporating the essential economic considerations that should
drive antitrust policy.'8
Importantly for purposes of analyzing the Bierig Article,
Addyston Pipe employs a functional analysis that focuses on the
17. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), a.U'd as
modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
18. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PAADx 26-30 (1978) (discussing
Taft's decision in Addyston Pipe as "one of the greatest if not the greatest, antitrust opinions
in the history of law").
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operational nature of alleged restraints. It makes its key inquiries
into the function a restraint serves in ordering business activities
among the parties and proffered justifications based on the re-
straint's utility in accomplishing that objective.' 9 This is to be
contrasted with consequential assessments that look to ultimate
effect and inquire into all relevant facts that shed light on the re-
straint's impact on social welfare. The narrower focus of func-
tional analysis recognizes the limited ability of courts accurately
to identify markets, estimate market power, and evaluate effects.
The foregoing perspective clarifies how the ancillary re-
straint doctrine should be applied. To avoid categorization as a
naked restraint, defendant must establish both that the coopera-
tive arrangement is of the kind that produces integrative or other
efficiencies and that the restraint is reasonably necessary to
achieve those benefits. Commentators have stressed that the ne-
cessity requirement should not be converted into a search for the
least restrictive alternative.20 Nevertheless, it is important to insist
that the restraint have a valid and significant nexus to the effi-
ciency-enhancing endeavor because that requirement provides at
least modest assurance that competitors' cooperative efforts will
redound to the benefit of consumers. To understand this point, it
is important to bear in mind that a restraint may have one or
both of the following functions: (1) the creation or exploitation
of economic power, and (2) the facilitation of productive cooper-
ation. The ancillary restraint doctrine rests on the premise that
restraint closely linked to efficiencies, and necessary to achieve
them, generally are more likely to serve the second function. In
addition, in cases involving both functions, the ancillary restraint
doctrine serves to bound collective activity by limiting the ex-
ploitation of power to the achievement of efficiency goals.2'
19. Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 291 (stating that to be ancillary, and hence exempt from a
per se rule, an agreement eliminating competition must be subordinate and collateral to a sep-
arate, legitimate transaction). See also Peter C. Carstensen, The Content of the Hollow Core
of Antitrust: The Chicago Board of Trade Case and the Meaning of the "Rule of Reason" in
Restraint of Trade Analysis, 15 R.s. iN L & EcoN. 1, 14 (stating that "[a] functional analysis
focuses on whether or not the particular restraint can in fact have the function claimed for it
and whether or not it is as limited as it can be to achieve only that functional goal.").
20. See, e.g., PHIL.LI E. AREDA. 7 ANmwrsT LAW 1 1505b (1986) (stating that "[tihe
key difficulty in examining less restrictive alternatives lies in deciding how refined a distinc-
tion to make among the possible alternatives.").
21. See Carstensen, supra note 19, at 10 (stating that "[b]y definition, society sacrifices
in a purely ancillary restraint no more economic value than is essential for the achievement
of the legitimate, that is, socially sanctioned, primary objective.").
Wintr1996]
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Ultimately, Bierig's analysis would have courts abjure sum-
mary condemnation (presumably under per se or other truncated
forms of review) 22 based upon consequentialist analysis. Specifi-
cally, his argument in favor of automatic rule of reason treatment
for all networks rests on the assumption that numerous other net-
works controlled by insurers, employers and third party payors
would prevent supracompetitive pricing.23 By requiring proof of
market power and other facts before condemning restraints, this
approach would defeat the purpose of presumptive rules. The po-
tential mischief of such a rule is seen in its application to the nu-
merous "sham" PPOs and IPAs that have been dealt with in the
past by summary condemnation by antitrust enforcers. 24 Forcing
the government to establish a potential effect on price under the
rule of reason almost certainly would defeat most prosecutions of
such cases; given the strictures of proving a case under the
defendant-friendly rule of reason (discussed below), one would
expect these obvious cartels to go unpunished.
Moreover, Bierig scarcely mentions the other essential
prong of the ancillary restraint doctrine: that is, that the restraint
must be reasonably necessary to achieve the benefits of integra-
tion. There is no obvious nexus between physician joint ventures
setting prices and achieving the presumed administrative and
transaction cost savings of forming a network.
22. See In re Massachusetts Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549, 585
(1988) (adopting a three-prong inquiry into restraints of trade that permits "quick look" or
truncated scrutiny and avoidance of the full requirements of the rule of reason).
23. Bierig, supra note 1. at 120. (stating that "[i]f physician-sponsored networks offer-
ing services on a discounted fee-for-service basis do not control costs, they will be economi-
cally unattractive and will fail in the marketplace."); Id. at 121 (stating that "[p]hysician-
sponsored networks must be prepared to compete on the merits if they are to succeed in the
market. They are in no position to dictate terms to purchasers. In these circumstances, it is
both anticompetitive and unfair to require physician-sponsored networks to comply with pro-
phylactic rules that are not applied to insurer-sponsored networks."). See also Jack R. Bierig,
Antitrust and Physician Involvement in Managed Care: Reform is Needed! 18-19 (Jan. 11,
1995) (unpublished paper presented to the Physician Payment Review Commission) (on file
with Health Matrix) (recommending like application of antitrust laws to physician-sponsored
and insurer-sponsored networks).
24. Southbank IPA, Inc., 57 Fed. Reg. 2913 (Fed. Trade Comm'n 1992) (dissolving
IPA by consent decree for unfair trade practices). See also Charles F. Rule, Antitrust in the
Health Care Field: Distinguishing Resistance from Adaptation, Address Before the Antitrust
and Health Care Seminar of the Antitrust Section of the Connecticut Bar Association and the
Connecticut Health Lawyers Association (Mar. 11, 1988), in JoHN J. MILEs, 4 HEALTH CARE
& ANTRmusT LAW, app. at Ell (1992) (discussing the evaluation of PPOs for antitrust viola-
tions); J. Paul McGrath, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Remarks at the 33rd
Annual ABA Antitrust Spring Meeting (Mar. 22, 1985), in JoHN J. MILES. 3 HEALTH CARE &
ANTITRUST LAW (1992).
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B. Price-Setting and Risk-Sharing
Bierig's second line of argument relies on a functional anal-
ysis more in keeping with the Addyston Pipe framework. Urging
that physician-sponsored networks should be able collectively to
set prices where they do not share risk through capitation or fee
withholds, he argues that there are sufficient efficiency-enhancing
benefits associated with offering a new service, shared adminis-
trative arrangements, and other cooperative efforts in PPOs that
they should not be treated as simple price-fixing endeavors. In
essence, Bierig can be understood to argue that a close appraisal
of the functional relationship of the restraint to its legitimate,
procompetitive purposes should prevent per se scrutiny.
To the extent that physician-controlled networks undertake
cooperative activities that amount to significant integration of the
kind just described, and that price agreements are necessary to
realize those benefits, it might seem at first blush that price
agreements among physicians in such plans should escape classi-
fication as a naked restraint. It is true that many PPOs undertake
detailed reviews of participating physicians' utilization patterns
and of the quality of care they provide. Often, case management
and other forms of cooperative integration are present and effec-
tive sanctions, such as disaffiliation, are imposed upon physicians
who do not meet the group's standards. Any plan with such re-
strictions would seem to produce a product that is truly distinct
from the individual services provided by the PPO's members and
qualify as a "new product" as that term is used in BML.25
Standing in the way, of course, is Maricopa26, in which the
Supreme Court held up risk-sharing as the talisman of a legiti-
mate joint venture and struck down a plan whose principle in-
tegrative activities were assembling a network and performing
administrative, utilization review, and negotiation services. Mari-
copa, moreover, raised (and answered in the negative) the legiti-
mate question as to whether collective price-setting is a "reason-
ably necessary" corollary for the PPO to market itself efficiently.
As to the risk-sharing requirement of Maricopa, I have sug-
gested that where legitimate integration does not include sharing
in the risk of medical overutilization, antitrust analysis might ac-
cept other significant forms of integration and abandon its "all-
25. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
26. Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
Winter 1996]
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or-nothing" approach.27 But at the same time, the finder of fact
should not assume that modest integration is as likely to reduce
the potential to harm competition as more complete integration.
However, courts should be careful to avoid the trap of associat-
ing mere assembly of a network of providers with achievement
of meaningful integration. Most cartels and virtually any form of
"joint selling agencies" achieve some transaction cost econo-
mies. Yet, as the Supreme Court was careful to point out in BMI,
only when those economies amount to an integration creating a
"different product" will per se treatment be inappropriate. 28
In essence, a sliding scale should be developed for dealing
with cases falling in the grey area of non-risk sharing integra-
tion: limited integration, stricter limits on market share, or per-
haps a lesser burden of proof required of plaintiff. My proposal
rests on several points. First, it is no secret that the rule of rea-
son, as currently interpreted, has become a defendant's paradise.
Few, if any, plaintiffs can shoulder the burden of proving mar-
kets, market power, absence of likely entry, likelihood of collu-
sion, and the myriad of other requirements entailing highly spec-
ulative evidence that have been heaped upon them. The wisdom
of allowing horizontal competitors engaged in price-setting while
proffering only marginal efficiency benefits to enjoy the full
splendor of the rule of reason seems dubious.
A second rationale for my approach is found in the reasons
supporting the emphasis placed on risk sharing by the Supreme
Court in Maricopa and the Department of Justice and Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) in their joint policy statements on this
subject.29 Strict emphasis on the importance of providers sharing
risk, and in particular, sharing the risk of overutilization or high
costs of services, is entirely appropriate given the peculiar mar-
27. See Greaney, supra note 15, at 1529-32. See also Thomas L. Greaney & Jody L.
Sindelar, Physician-Sponsored Joint Ventures: An Antitrust Analysis of Preferred Provider Or-
ganizations, 18 RuroEts LJ. 513, 586-89 (1987) (noting that market share, market concentra-
tion, and procompetitive effect should be analyzed in identifying presumptive risk); FumRow
Er AL, supra note 13, at § 10-35.
28. See BMI, 441 U.S. at 21 (stating that "[t]o the extent that the blanket license is a
different product, [BMI] is not really a joint selling agency offering the goods of many
sellers").
29. U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM'N., STATEMENTS OF ENFORCEMENU Potucy
AND ANAL'nCAL PRiNCIPLES RELATNG TO HEALTH CARE AND ANTrrRUsT (1994), reprinted in
4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 13,152 (Sept. 30, 1994) [hereinafter 1994 ANrrrusT ENFOR E-
MENtr GuimaDuNs] (noting requirement of shared risks as qualification of physician network
joint venture for antitrust safety zone).
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ket conditions of health services delivery and insurance.30 For ex-
ample, risk sharing through capitation deals effectively with
moral hazard in insurance by forcing providers to bear the finan-
cial consequences of overutilization. That is, risk-based payment
encourages providers to practice cost-effective medicine and mit-
igates the perverse incentives of insurance and information inade-
quacy. Moreover, providers sharing substantial risk of success of
a network are more likely to maximize efficiencies associated
with integration.
The essential point is that while less complete integration
arguably may enhance efficiency by lowering certain transaction
costs and joint expenses, such arrangements do not effectively go
to the underlying incentives facing individual providers, espe-
cially where providers are members of multiple plans. Indeed,
the "free-rider" and fragmentation problems associated with cost
containment where individual health plans do not command par-
ticipating physicians' loyalty and cannot capture the benefits of
innovations in cost containment are exacerbated where there is
no meaningful sharing of risks. Individual physicians simply
have little reason to toe the line when reimbursement is not
closely tied to their individual efforts to control costs.
C. Size of Networks
Bierig's second proposed reform would grant provider-con-
trolled networks latitude to include large numbers of participating
physicians. He suggests that antitrust doctrine should be inter-
preted to allow physician networks to include the same percent-
age of physicians in the market as do networks controlled by
third party payors. Alternatively, he argues that legislation should
fix an appropriate benchmark.31 Bierig does not attempt to de-
fend this proposal seriously on legal or economic grounds. He
offers no precedents or economic foundation for supposing that a
horizontal combination of such magnitude should escape antitrust
scrutiny. Instead, he advances vague notions of equity, claiming
that physician networks suffer discriminatory treatment and are
30. For a more complete development of this argument, see Greaney, supra note 15, at
1531.
31. AMA-endorsed legislative proposals have suggested establishing safe harbors for
networks comprised of 50% of the physicians in a market. See AMA Suggests Refinement,
supra note 5, at 487.
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prejudiced unnecessarily in the market. Of course, on a fully de-
veloped factual record, it may well be that a network possessing
the legitimate integrative attributes discussed in the previous sec-
tion could satisfy the necessity requirement by establishing the
linkage between obtaining commitments from physicians to
change their practice patterns and an agreement on fee levels.
Nevertheless, on Bierig's broader claim that competitive eq-
uity requires loosening restrictions on network size, the supposed
inhibitions are more imagined than real.
Following Maricopa, even if integrative efficiencies are
present, summary condemnation still may be appropriate because
price-fixing is probably not necessary to achieve those benefits.
There is no obvious reason why administrative coordination and
network formation cannot go forward without physicians collec-
tively setting their fees. Separate fee negotiations with physicians
is entirely feasible: indeed, contrary to Bierig's claim, it is
closely analogous to what third party payors routinely do to set
up their own networks.
First, there is no hard and fast antitrust rule that would in-
hibit physicians forming networks where economies of scale or
other factors dictate exceeding the thirty percent threshold. As
the policy statements make clear, that figure only represents a
"safety zone" that may be exceeded in small markets and other
circumstances. 32 Indeed, the agencies' advisory opinions have ap-
proved networks with physician panels that exceeded the safety
zone. 33 More tellingly, enforcement actions make it clear that an-
titrust does not inhibit provider-controlled plans from assembling
large networks of physicians: it limits only the degree to which
core "owner" physicians can use their plan to advance price or
utilization objectives. Consent decrees recently entered into be-
32. 1994 ANTrRusT ENFORCEMENT GUIDEUNES, supra note 29, at 1 20,788-89 (noting
that physician network joint ventures may exceed the 30% threshold under special circum-
stances without being held illegal per se).
33. Letter from Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
U.S. Department of Justice, to George Miron, Feith & Zell (Dec. 8, 1993) (approving state-
wide California chiropractic managed care organization combining up to 50% of chiropractors
in a relevant market); Letter from Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, U.S. Department of Justice, to Eugene E. Olson, Connolly, O'Malley, Lillis, Hansen
& Olson (July 6, 1994) (approving Iowa provider network including more than 20% of physi-
cians in 12 particular specialty areas); Letter from Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, to John R. Cummins, Greenbaum
Doll & McDonald (Oct. 27, 1994) (approving Kentucky provider network made up of 37% of
area physicians).
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tween the Department of Justice and two physician-hospital orga-
nizations permit provider controlled organizations to subcontract
with a large number (indeed, potentially 100%) of the physicians
in their markets.34 A plan that meets the criteria suggested by the
Antitrust Enforcement Guildelines may enter into subcontracts
with an unlimited number of providers as long as the financial
arrangements with the subcontracting physicians do not substan-
tially replicate the compensation to the physician owners. By
preserving incentives of the physician owners to bargain down
the fees of subcontracting physicians, this arrangement promotes
competitive pricing and does not lessen incentives for the sub-
contracting physicians to join competing plans. This option effec-
tively demolishes the contention that physician networks are
competitively harmed by antitrust's inhibition on their offering
plans with wide provider choice. Thus, the law does not interfere
with physician networks achieving efficiencies associated with
larger membership than provided by the safety zone. In fact,
there is no evidence that providers have been chilled in their ef-
forts to form networks. Between fifteen and twenty percent of all
managed care entities are provider-controlled, and nearly three-
fourths of all state medical societies are in the process of estab-
lishing physician-sponsored networks.35
More fundamentally, the different treatment of physician-
and payor-controlled networks reflects the distinction, well-
established in antitrust law and solidly rooted in economic the-
ory, between the risks associated with vertical and horizontal re-
straints of trade. Simply put, vertical combinations are more
likely to have integrative efficiency justifications, and to realize
them, than are horizontal combinations. There is no reason to as-
sume that independent third party payors willingly will overpay
for physician inputs. By contrast, combinations of competing
doctors jointly setting fees are hardly as likely to be vigilant in
insisting on price concessions from their members. Moreover, as
noted earlier, in this industry competitive risks associated with
34. United States v. HealthCare Partners, Inc., No. 395-CV-01946RNC (D. Conn. filed
Sept. 13, 1995), 61 Fed. Reg. 3731 (1996) (describing final consent judgment); United States
v. Health Choice of Northwest Missouri, Civ. Action No. 95-6171-CV-SJ-6 (W.D. Mo. filed
Sept. 13, 1995), 60 Fed. Reg. 51,808 (1995) (publishing final consent judgment).
35. See PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REv. COMM'N, supra note 4, at 294-95 (summarizing
surveys and concluding that the evidence concerning enforcement of antitrust laws does not
warrant legislative amendments to those laws).
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horizontal combinations are particularly acute. Overly broad phy-
sician networks reduce the number of integrated health plans one
can expect to develop in a market. As suggested by the New En-
gland Journal of Medicine study, a large proportion of the coun-
try can support only a limited number of plans and hence make
the prospects of effective competition precarious.3 6 Permissive
antitrust rules that countenance large physician-controlled net-
works likely will reduce the number of effective competing plans
in the numerous markets and entrench oligopolistic provider af-
filiations, thus undermining the benefits of managed competition.
D. The AMA's Plea for Legislative Relief
Bierig urges that if the antitrust laws cannot be interpreted
to permit physician-controlled networks to develop as he pro-
poses, Congress should adopt appropriate legislative exemptions.
A vaguely worded legislative exemption would carry considera-
ble risk. It may be construed in such a way as to make it impos-
sible to prosecute garden-variety cartels, for example by allowing
minimal integrative activities to necessitate full-blown rule of
reason analysis. Moreover, the grounds for his claim that physi-
cians need to combine in large networks they control remains
unclear. Physicians already are free to form risk-sharing networks
of all kinds, so the specific problem must lie with the require-
ment that physicians assume financial risk. This places the physi-
cian community in the untenable position of petitioning for leave
to coordinate their pricing activities without undertaking to inte-
grate their clinical practices or to assume financial arrangements
that provide incentives and avoid overutilization of services. All
this without a hint that physician control of networks would
somehow improve service, competitiveness, or somehow
uniquely add value. Coupled with the request to combine net-
works consisting of the lion's share of physicians in each market,
the proposal begins to sound like a rear-guard action to slow the
pace of managed care's reconfiguration of the physician
marketplace.
36. See Kronick et al., supra note 15.
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CONCLUSION
In an ideal world, antitrust analyses would appraise under
the rule of reason those physician networks falling in the grey
area between risk sharing and less-complete forms of integration,
carefully weighing competitive harms against benefits. However,
it bears reminding that, as an administrative system, antitrust law
is only as good as the ability of judges, prosecutors, and lawyers
to understand and apply it. As Justice Breyer has cautioned,
"[r]ules that seek to embody every economic complexity and
qualification may well, through the vagaries of administration,
prove counter-productive, undercutting the very economic ends
they seek to serve."' 37 Hence, antitrust law appropriately resorts
to proxies. Given the peculiar economics of health care, risk
sharing provides a passable proxy for the degree of integration
and hence the likely efficiency benefits of physician network
ventures. While a more refined analysis might be desirable, it
would be necessary to take into account the extent of meaningful
physician integration in assessing potential harms. Such finely
tuned balancing may well prove to be beyond the ken of we
mere mortals who labor in the vineyards of antitrust law.
37. Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983).
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